Five ways Russia’s war in Ukraine has changed life and repression at home

Four years of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine have fundamentally reshaped the country’s system of political repression. With many discriminatory and repressive practices already in place before 2022, the state significantly expanded their use following the invasion. Newly enacted laws banning so-called ‘fake news’ about the war and ‘discrediting the army’ have effectively prohibited all war-directed criticism. Repression has gradually intensified: more people are being imprisoned, and sentences are progressively becoming harsher. The authorities are increasing the use of anti-terrorism and anti-extremism legislation to target journalists, politicians, prisoners of war, etc. This article by OVD-INFO sets out five key findings on how the war has reshaped repression in Russia.

Anti-war protests broke out within hours of the invasion. In February and early March, rallies were held across many cities. The security forces, known in Russia as siloviki, detained protesters with widespread use of force, a number of detainees were tortured while in custody. Despite this, people continued to voice their opposition to the war throughout 2022.

The announcement of partial mobilisation in September triggered a fresh wave of protests. The relatives of drafted men took to the streets. Security forces detained women in two regions with large ethnic minority populations: in Dagestan in the North Caucasus, for blocking roads; in Yakutia in the Far East, for chanting ‘No to genocide! .’ In Dagestan, criminal charges were brought against several protesters.

OVD-Info has recorded more than 20,000 detentions in 2022—the highest figure in at least 15 years. The previous record was set a year earlier, during protests in support of Alexei Navalny, when more than 15,000 were detained.

Just eight days into the invasion, new legislation introduced administrative and criminal liability for ‘discrediting the army’ (Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code). Police and courts interpreted the new law very broadly: anti-war statements made online or in public spaces, certain symbols and imagery, and the defacement of military campaign materials issued by Russia’s Armed Forces could all be deemed ‘discrediting.’ Violations are punishable by fines or imprisonment. In 2022, 5,560 administrative cases were opened under this article; 2,950 more were filed the following year. Over the same two-year period, at least 162 individuals faced criminal charges.

The authorities also made extensive use of Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code, which criminalises the spread of ‘fake news’ about the Russian army. Charges were brought against those who shared information about military actions or casualties contradicting official Russian statements—including reports of war crimes committed by Russian forces. In 2022–2023, 288 individuals were prosecuted under this article.

By the end of 2022, the authorities had initiated at least 857 instances of political persecution, 70% of which were in some way connected to the war. By the end of 2023, the figure stood at 836, with 62% linked to the war.

In 2022-2023, security forces increasingly suppressed any public protests related to criticising the invasion of Ukraine. Over these two years, 211 anti-war individuals were imprisoned. Political repressions spread and grew more severe, and unprecedented pressure effectively stifled any public discussion regarding the war and its conduct. A notable development was the designation of the youth democratic movement “Vesna” as an extremist organisation based on its attempts to coordinate anti-war protests.

To maintain regime stability during wartime, the state not only invented new methods of repression but also actively used and expanded existing ones.

By the beginning of March 2022, alongside the law on discrediting the army, the State Duma adopted one concerning “fakes” about the army (Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code). The wording of this article was partially copied from articles penalising fakes about the Covid 19 virus (Articles 207.1 and 207.2 of the Criminal Code)—those were not broadly used with approximately twenty convictions reported in total. Meanwhile, by the fourth anniversary of the war, 422 individuals had been prosecuted for disseminating false information about the army.

The administrative res judicata principle in the article on discrediting the army, which permits the prosecution of an individual in criminal court for a subsequent similar action after a court ruled against them on an administrative offence, appeared in Russian legislation back in the early 2010s. It was later used in an article concerning repeated violations during protests and later extended to other restrictive laws. In 2022, this principle was further introduced to four additional articles, including those related to discrediting the military and calls for sanctions (Article 284.2 of the Criminal Code).

How they taught us the fear of protests Russian version Date of publication: 18.04.2023 Data as of 10.02.2023 Introduction—If I go to the rally today and they catch me again, would it be considered aggravating circumstances?—What are my options if they catch me for the third time?—What kind of punishment can I face if they arrest me again?

OVD-Info

During the war, the State Duma has been consistently intensifying legislation targeting “foreign agents.” This process has progressively stripped designated individuals of certain civil rights—such as the right to engage in educational activities—and broadened the scope for criminal prosecution. The law on “foreign agents” was enacted in 2012, and its discriminatory impact has only grown over time. The Ministry of Justice began systematically adding people to the “foreign agents” registry in 2021, initially with 110 entries. In 2022, 188 more individuals were listed; in 2023, the list expanded by 227; in 2024, by 164; and in 2025, by 219.

In 2015, the law on “undesirable organisations” was enacted. Under the guise of preventing “undesirable” activities, the government gained the power to ban any foreign or international organisation it found inconvenient. Over the six pre-war years, 42 organisations had been designated as “undesirable.” During the four war years, this number increased by 280. In 2019, former “Open Russia” activist Anastasia Shevchenko became the first person to face criminal charges related to participation in an “undesirable” organisation. In 2024, at least 26 individuals had been prosecuted under similar charges, during 2025—35 more.

During the war, the government has extensively expanded its use of terrorist legislation in politically motivated cases including provisions adopted in 2016 and known as “Yarovaya package”. At that time, the State Duma equated online justifications of terrorism (Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code) with similar actions committed on media platforms. In 2024-2025, charges of justifying terrorism and inciting terrorism became the most frequently used accusations in political cases. The 2016 provisions also upped punishments for extremist offenses, which have been also actively employed in political repression.

The entirety of extremist and terrorist articles had undoubtedly been used in political repressions even before the war—to persecute Crimean Tatars, Jehovah’s Witnesses, “citizens of the USSR,” anti-fascists, members of the prison subculture, football fans, National Bolshevik Party supporters, and other groups. A massive, lasting campaign of persecution was launched after the 2018 explosion at the FSB office in Arkhangelsk—at least 38 criminal cases were opened across the country under the charges of justifying terrorism.

Over the years, FSB along with the Ministry of Interior’s Centre “E” have built a high-tech infrastructure permitting to identify comment authors and track their locations. Since the major opposition protests of 2011, law enforcement agencies have been systematically constructing a system of pressure targeting activists, politicians, and journalists. Consequently, by the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities already had in their possession a broad legal framework for combatting dissent and a streamlined logic for its implementation, which enabled a rapid escalation of repression.

Already on the first day of the invasion, Roskomnadzor demanded that the media only report war news “based on official Russian sources” and warned journalists about liability for publishing “false information.” Shortly thereafter, the agency began mass-blocking the media websites, gradually cutting access to all independent media resources. On March 1, the websites of Echo Moskvy radio station and Dozhd TV channel were blocked. According to Roskomsvoboda, a total of more than 9,000 websites were blocked as part of military censorship in 2022. Many journalists were forced to leave Russia or work under pseudonyms.

Throughout the four years of the war, media outlets have been mass-added to the registries of “foreign agents” and designated as “undesirable” organisations. The latter effectively means a ban on working and receiving financial support from within Russia.

A total of 179 journalists have become defendants in politically motivated criminal cases during the war. Over four years, 100 bloggers have also faced prosecution. Since 2022, media staffers and bloggers have accounted for approximately 10% of all those politically persecuted.

The authorities are actively putting pressure on major internet players—video hosting services, messengers, and media corporations. By the fourth year of the invasion, almost all popular foreign social networks have been blocked, while Meta corporation has been also designated an extremist organisation. Since 2024, YouTube has been throttled in Russia, and in 2025, Roskomnadzor began blocking FaceTime, as well as Telegram and WhatsApp. In their place, Russia is imposing the state messenger Max, whose security is being questioned by experts.

At the same time, due to drone attacks on Russian cities, mobile internet is regularly shut down in various regions. In some regions, the mobile network has been non-functional for extended periods. Against this backdrop, authorities are testing a “sovereign internet” and “white lists”—registries of government websites that remain accessible even during blackouts.

By the fourth anniversary of the war, Russia has imposed strict military censorship. Only representatives of state-controlled media are permitted to cover combat operations in Ukraine. The overwhelming majority of independent media outlets have been blocked, forced out of the country, and assigned the discriminatory labels of “foreign agent” or “undesirable” organisation, while some of their employees have been placed on wanted lists.

Among the repressive legislative initiatives introduced since the start of the war is an expansion of the range of crimes against state security. For instance, a “lighter” form of high treason has been introduced (Article 275.1 of the Criminal Code—confidential cooperation with a foreign state or organisation threatening the security of the Russian Federation), and the “espionage” article has been amended to include wording on the transfer of information during an armed conflict “for the purpose of passing it to the enemy.”

According to calculations by the human rights project “First Department”, throughout the 1997-2024 period, the overwhelming majority of high treason cases were opened after February 24, 2022. According to the Supreme Court judicial department data, in the first half of 2025, 115 verdicts for high treason were handed down—nearly double the number from a year earlier. At the same time, “First Department” considers the official statistics to be uncomplete. Grounds for prosecution for high treason can include transferring a small sum to a Ukrainian fund or publishing academic papers containing non-classified data.

Alongside cases of high treason, espionage, and confidential cooperation with foreign nationals, the number of cases related to terrorism and extremism is also growing. The most common charges are: aiding terrorism (Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code), carrying out a terrorist act (Article 205), and calls for terrorism (Article 205.2). In the past two years, Article 205.2 has become the most frequently used charge in political cases, surpassing the spread of “fake news” about the army.

Grounds for such cases include damage to civilian infrastructure—arson attacks on military recruitment offices and relay boxes—communication with individuals who present themselves as members of the Russian Volunteer Corps or Freedom of Russia Legion, as well as favorable public statements about Ukrainian Armed Forces’ strikes on Russian territory.

The state also frames anticolonial activism—the fight for the rights of ethnic minorities—in criminal terms. The publication Komi Daily has been included on a list of 172 organisations that the FSB considers “structural subdivisions” of the “Forum of Free Nations of Post-Russia.” This forum has been designated a terrorist organisation for promoting the idea of regions seceding from the Russian state. However, the list of “subdivisions” includes decolonial groups that were not part of the forum, as well as 68 organisations that may not exist at all.

The Rosfinmonitoring registry of terrorists and extremists has been growing noticeably faster in recent years. In 2024–2025, more than seven thousand individuals were added—twice as many compared to 2022–2023. Over the past two years, 165 children under the age of 16 have been added to the registry, whereas previously only 15 children had ever been included throughout the entire history of the list.

OVD-Info cannot state with absolute certainty that all those listed in Russia’s Federal Financial Monitoring Service’s (Rosfinmonitoring) registry, or all the defendants in terrorism cases, are victims of repressions. However, the explosive rise of these practices, together with state actors’ deliberate blurring and broadening of the definitions of crimes against state security, extremism, and terrorism, allows us to tentatively view this as an indirect sign of politicisation of the sphere.

The war has not only provoked an unprecedented campaign of pressure on society, but in fact, also became a pretext to intensify the attack on private life. More and more often, the authorities exploit the rhetoric of traditional values and use legislation to persecute those who oppose them.

Shortly before the war’s third anniversary, the Supreme Court banned the non‑existent “international LGBT movement,” marking a new wave of repression against queer people in Russia: by February 2026, according to “Vykhod (Coming out)” group, 852 cases of pressure against the LGBTQ community had been recorded.

Police carry out raids in clubs and bars searching for queer people. Private individuals and business representatives are fined over slight hints of non‑heterosexual relationships. Streaming platforms are forced to remove scenes from films and series. Books are being censored, with descriptions of “non‑traditional” relationships being erased. Three employees of the “Eksmo” publishing house have become defendants in a criminal case for publishing books with LGBTQ characters.

In addition to LGBT “propaganda,” childfree “propaganda” is also banned. At the same time, some regions have effectively introduced bans on abortion. Gender‑affirming surgeries are officially prohibited.

Censorship and restrictions also affect artists who did not support the invasion or those who condemned it. They face cancelled concerts or a complete ban on performing within the country, and some have had criminal cases opened against them. The actor Maksim Vitorgan took an anti‑war position and was consequently replaced in the series “Contact” with an AI‑generated image.

The government has also turned its attention to education: a number of foreign educational and academic organisations have been labeled “undesirable,” for example, Yale University. This severely limits Russians’ ability to study or work at international institutions and on global projects, and cuts off connections between communities.

As part of its new ideological agenda, the state has stepped up prosecutions for remarks the authorities consider disrespectful to religion and the Great Patriotic War. Charges brought under the law against “rehabilitating Nazist ideology” have become ones of those most common in politically motivated cases.

As the sociologist and cultural historian Ilya Kukulin told OVD‑Info, the authorities interpret the above actions as an attack on state ideology. This way, the state seeks to defend a socio‑cultural order and historical narrative that it finds acceptable.

Revising the public memory of Stalinist repressions has also become a major topic. The “Leaders and Victims” monument is being taken out of downtown Moscow under the pretext of restoration, and authorities plan to replace the Gulag History Museum with a museum dedicated to the Nazi genocide of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War.

Using these various instruments, the state is increasingly imposing its ideology on society. Anything that falls outside this ideology is deemed “non‑traditional” and harmful.